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ABSTRACT
Shelley* seems to Base his system of morals most closely on that of 
the British empiricists, and, especially, Hume, He derives his concept 
of the imagination from Hume and its role plays a major importance in 
Shelley. Shelley regards the imagination as superior to the reason, for 
it is the Basis of all knowledge. As it is the correlating power between 
man and the universe, its creations, which Shelley calls, in whatever 
form, poetry, are a reflection of the influence of nature or society on 
man*s mind. The reason only distinguishes between ideas created by the 
imagination in order to determine those which can be made useful.
Evil for Shelley is largely subjective in nature and results from 
many's failure to cultivate his imagination in order to regulate his re­
lations with his fellow men, the realm of morals. The man who has fa­
miliarized himself with the good which exists in thought, action and 
persons not his own has a vast associative response in his unconscious. 
The imagination, which comfnands the unconscious, instinctively adjusts 
his thoughts to present events, The reason, which is a conscious power 
has a limited view and less efficiently fits means to ends.
The Defence states that "without an intermixture of the poetical 
element . , , [evil] , . , must ever flow from the unmitigated exercise 
of the reason" (VII, p, 356), Systems, whether civil, religious, scien­
tific, or economic in nature, imposed upon man by reasoners without 
scrutiny of the effects, may destroy man^s sensibility. Only the ima-^ 
gination, cultivated by an habitual perception of the consequences of 
actions, can accommodate calculations of the reason to man's inner
ii
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nature. Evil may be said to result from an imagination gap in man's 
moral reasoning.
Man cultivates his imagination by empathy, putting himself in the 
place of others. The thoughts and feelings of his fellow men must be­
come his own. Love acts to cultivate the imagination, for it is a 
"going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the 
beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own"(De­
fence , VII, p. 118). It is only when man's sympathies have been enlarged 
to an affinity with those of all mankind, both in the present and the
past, that he rises above the temporal order, the realm of reason. Then
j
the creations of his imagination partake of the eternal and the universal.
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INTRODUCTION
An inquiry into Shelley's theory of evil requires some investigation 
of his system of philosophy. For this purpose, I intend to deal mainly 
with his prose for its more explicit statement of his ideas. The essay 
most relevant to my problem is A Defence of Poetry. Written in the spring 
of 1821, it is Shelley's last major prose work and contains the maturest 
expression in prose of his philosophy. Of the earlier works I wish to 
deal' primarily with "Speculations on Morals," "Speculations on Metaphy­
sics" and "On the Punishment of Death," as they are concerned more 
specifically with my problem. I am confining discussion of Shelley's 
poetry to Prometheus Unbound and "Ode to Liberty," and I refer to them 
mainly to exemplify some of my thesis statements.
Most of the critical writings on Shelley indicate inconsistency in 
his thought due to the fact that he is generally considered wholly 
Platonic. Viewing Shelley's earlier works from the vantage point of the 
Defence, however, reveals that his system makes up a coherent whole, for 
the ideas in the Defence are found in nascent form in the earlier prose. 
The evidence of these writings also shows that Shelley owes much to em­
piricism, the main current of thought in his day. These, perhaps, are 
the most significant discoveries of my work and, taken in view of 
typical Shelley criticism, quite radical. But recent critics of Shelley 
also find consistency and a debt to empiricism and advocate the reading 
of Shelley's prose as a key to his thought.'*'
1 Some of these critics and their works are: David Lee Clark,
1
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Evil and its cause are a prominent concern in Shelley's work. Con­
sidering the times in which he wrote, we -can appreciate why, for most of 
his work falls between 1813 and 1822, a period of war, oppression, and 
severe economic conditions in Europe and England. Many events, whether 
they were a sign of hope or an act of tyranny, would spur Shelley to 
write, the Peterloo Massacre and the 1820 revolution in Spain inspiring 
respectively, "The Masque of Anarchy" and "Ode to Liberty." As a result, 
many of his works either cry out against tyranny or herald some occurrence 
which signals the revival of freedom.
In times of unrest it is natural to look for some cause in the hope 
that its eradication will bring about a change. This is the role that 
Shelley assigns to the poet:
Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; 
the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon 
the present; the words which express what they understand not; 
the trumpets which sing to battle, and feel not what £hey 
inspire; the influence which is moved not, but moves.
It is with this attitude that Shelley turns towards the problems of the
world.
Shelley believes that evil takes two forms, one subjective in nature, 
and the other objective. Objective evil, including earthquakes, disease, 
mutability and death, is part of the natural order of existence. Man 
eventually may alleviate the effects of many of these evils, although 
in Prometheus Unbound, even after Jupiter's fall and the return of love
Shelley's Prose: The Trumpet of a Prophecy, 1954; Earl Wasserman, Prome­
theus Unbound, 1965; C.E. Pulos, The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley's 
Skepticism, 1954; Donald H. Reiman, Shelley's "The Triumph of Life": A 
Critical Study, 1965.
2 Percy Bysshe- Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, The Complete Works of 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck, 10 vols. (New 
York, 1965)^ VII, p. 140. All quotations from Shelley's works, unless 
otherwise noted, are from this edition.
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have effected man’s regeneration, he is still subject to "chance, and 
death, and mutability" (III, iv, 1. 201).
Subjective evil is largely of man's own making. Queen Mab tells us 
that "Han . . . fabricates/ The sword which stabs his peace" (III, 11.
3199-200). Because of its nature, subjective evil would seem easily 
removed, prompting Shelley, who wonders why man acquiesces in his condi­
tion to cry out frequently against the tyranny of kings, priests and
■i'government, as in this passage from The Revolt of Islam:
'This need not be; ye might arise, and will
That gold should lose its power, and thrones their glory;
That love, which none may bind, be free to fill 
The world, like light; and evil faith, grown hoary 
With crime, be quenched and die . . .
Dungeons and palaces are transitory—
High temples fade like vapour— man alone
Remains, whose will has power when all beside is gone.1,
(VIII, xvi, 11. 3334-42)
Since Shelley feels that subjective evil can be removed by man, his
(
primary concern with this aspect of the problem of evil forms the focus 
of my paper.
A concern with subjective evil necessitates an understanding of man. 
Shelley considers that philosophers who are subjective, use inductive 
reasoning, refer to experience and are opposed to external forms provide 
the proper emphasis for this type of inquiry. A Philosophical View of 
Reform cites Bacon, Spinoza, Hobbes, Bayle, and Montaigne as originators 
of this new form of inquiry (VII, p. 8)."* Docke and the 'philosophers
3 Compare "Julian and Maddalo," 11. 170-171; "Ode to Liberty,"
11. 243-245; and A Philosophical View of Reform: "Mankind seem to ac­
quiesce, as in a necessary condition of the imbecility of their own will 
and reason, in the existence of an aristocracy" (VII, p. 228).
4 Compare Prometheus Unbound: " . . .  The Man remains . . . the 
King/ Over himself" (III, iv, 11. 193-197).
5 "Descartes cancelled for Bayle MS" (VII, p. 334).
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of his exact and intelligible but superficial school" come next and,
6finally, Berkeley and Hume (VII, pp. 8-9). Unlike his contemporaries, 
Leibniz and Descartes, Spinoza, a Jew, was under no compulsion to adapt 
his ideas to Christian theology. "Speculations on Metaphysics," rejec­
ting Aristotle for giving "Logic the name of Metaphysics," also censures 
modern philosophers for not strictly adhering to Bacon's inductive 
method (VII, p. 63).^
A Philosophical View of Reform, honouring the above-mentioned 
philosophers, heralds a "new epoch" of philosophical inquiry which, 
making a "deeper enquiry into the forms of human nature," finds ideas 
which are "incompatible with an unreserved belief in any of those popular 
mistakes upon which popular systems of faith with respect tp the cause
and agencies of the universe, with all their superstructure of political
and religious tyranny, are built" (VII, p. 8). The practitioners of this 
new philosophy
indicated inferences the most incompatible with the popular 
religions and the established governments of Europe. Philoso­
phy went forth into the inchanted forest of the demons of
worldly power, as the pioneer of the over-growth of ages.
(VII, pp. 8-9)
The forests are the established beliefs of religion and government. This 
new philosophy, by investigating the forms of human nature, reveals an 
incompatibility between man and existing systems of law. Man has created 
these external forms through the use of reason. What these philosophers 
found is that a re-establishment of external laws based on the Inner laws 
of human nature is needed.
6 "Hartley" was cancelled for "Berkeley" in the manuscript (VII, p.
334) .
7 Locke is included along with Aristotle, no doubt for becoming too 
deeply concerned with words.
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Han has too long been defined in terms of the analytic fallacy.
Aristotle defines things in terms of their specific differences. The
specific difference in man is his reason. But too much emphasis has
been placed on his reason instead of a consideration of his integrity.
Man has been forced to play an angel while he is actually partly animal.
The modern philosophers attempted to investigate this fallacy.
Shelley, investigating the inner forms of human nature, finds that the
imagination is the superior faculty and more exactly defines man's
character. He states in "Speculations on Metaphysics" that
Most of the errors of philosophers have arisen from 
considering the human being in a point of view too detailed 
! and circumscribed. He is not a moral, and an intellectual,
— but also, and pre-eminently, an imaginative being.
(VII, 65)
Man should be defined as an imaginative animal, which is his synthetic 
difference from all other beings, not by his analytic split-up and there­
fore false difference.
The chief problem of man in a world of change is his difficulty in 
determining right and wrong; he lacks a stable basis from which to judge. 
Shelley inherits the tradition of the eighteenth century empiricists who 
do not allow for the existence of anything which cannot be experienced. 
Since we never perceive the reality underlying appearances, the reason 
is not infallible. Hume, who applies this sceptical philosophy most 
rigorously, finds, however, that the imagination gives man a degree of 
stability; and Shelley seems to adopt his postion.
Hume describes two activities of the imagination. Through fancy it 
combines ideas in an infinite variety of ways. Hume calls these ideas
g
"fictions". The imagination also combines ideas according to certain 
mental determinations when the mind is excited by external objects. These
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ideas Hume calls "belief" (Enquiries, p. 47). Ideas of belief are dis­
tinguished from fictions by a feeling implanted by the effect of custom 
on our minds. This latter activity of the imagination gives man a 
degree of security in his judgments.
Custom is defined in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
Wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation 
produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, 
without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the
understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the
effect of custom. (Enquiries, p. 43)
This propensity is due to the imagination. The imagination is the cor­
relating power between man and the universe. Whenever an object is
presented to the memory or senses, the imagination revives its correlative
idea, the idea previously imprinted on the mind by nature. The constant 
conjunction of events observable in nature leads to the association of 
ideas in the mind. If the imagination is free to respond to impressions, 
there will be a harmony between the thoughts in man's mind and the 
course of nature and, although man is ignorant of the cause of events, he 
finds security.
All of the ideas in man's mind have an essential unity, as they have
been associated by the "constant conjunction of events" observable in
■
9nature. Reason then considers the relations between ideas in order to 
determine those which can be made subservient to our animal nature. As 
reason is the analytical faculty, it abstracts parts from the ideas 
created by the imagination. The abstractions are then taken as defining
8 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, ed. L.A. 
Selby-Bigge (London, 1902), p . 47. All quotations from Hume's works, 
unless otherwise noted, are from this edition.
9 Both Shelley and Hume use the phrase, "a constant conjunction of 
events."
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the whole and, thus, the original unity is lost;
The one ^"imagination^ is the . . . principle of synthesis, 
and has for its objects those forms which are common to 
universal nature and existence itself; and the other is the 
, . . principle of analysis, and its action regards the 
relations of things, simply as relations; considering thoughts, 
not in their integral unity, but as the algebraical represen­
tations which conduct to certain general results.
(A Defence of Poetry, VII, p. 109)
Man defines things in terms of abstractions and such definitions 
become his terms of reference in forming his judgments. The qualitative 
value of thoughts is forgotten and man loses his intense apprehension of 
life. He enslaves himself by submitting to an external order which seems 
immutable, an observation which Shelley makes of the French in A Philo- 
osphical View of Reform:
The French were what their literature is (excluding Mon­
taigne and Rousseau, and some leaders of the . . . ) weak, 
superficial, vain, with little imagination, and with passions 
as well as judgments cleaving to the external form of things.
(VII, pp. 13-14)
A separation between reason and imagination causes evil, for thoughts 
are no longer being considered in their "integral unity". An "inter­
mixture" of reason and imagination brings the qualitative value back into 
thoughts. This is represented in Prometheus Unbound when Asia and Pro­
metheus are reunited. Prometheus, whose name means foresight, represents 
the imagination; Asia is love. The two characters are able to perceive 
the essential unity of all thoughts when they are united;
. . . We will search, with looks and words of love,
For hidden thoughts, . . . and . . .
Weave harmonies divine, yet ever new,
From difference sweet where discord cannot be.
(Ill, iii, 11. 34-39)
Through love, man is able to respond imaginatively. The harmony 
underlying existence can then be seen. As Asia in Prometheus Unbound
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also says, "love . . . makes the reptile equal to the God" (II, v, 11. 
39-43). Epipsychidion, written two years later, repeats the same idea:
I know
That Love makes all things equal: I have heard 
By mine own heart this joyous truth averred:
The spirit of the worm beneath the sod 
In love and worship, blends itself with God.
(11. 125-129)
The reason, as D.H. Lawrence illustrates in "Snake," distinguishes
between things and thus man commits evil:
The voice of my education said to me
He must be killed,
• For in Sicily the black, black snakes are innocent, the gold 
are venomous.
A Defence of Poetry warns that a separation between reason and
imagination causes evil. "Reasoners" must
beware that their speculations, for want of correspondence 
with those first principles which belong to the imagination, 
do not tend . . .  to exasperate at once the extremes of 
luxury and want. . . . The rich have become richer, and the 
poor have become poorer . . . .  Such are the effects which
must ever flow from an unmitigated exercise of the calcula­
ting faculty. (VII, p. 132)
In an earlier draft of this same passage Shelley writes, "But without an 
intermixture of the poetical element, such are the effects which must 
ever flow from the unmitigated exercise of the reason" (VII, p. 356). 
Evil may be said to result from an imagination gap in man's moral judg­
ments. In my thesis. I wish to develop fully Shelley's interpretation of 
the imagination and the reason and the roles he assigns to each.
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CHAPTER I
THE IMAGINATION AND THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
A discussion of reason and imagination and the roles proper to each 
makes up much of the content of _A Defence of Poetry. In that work 
Shelley calls the imagination the creative faculty and reason the analy­
tic, designating the former as the superior power. The function of the 
imagination seems to be to create the forms, habits and ideas of man's 
thought.
Shelley's interpretation of the imaginaton is significant, for it 
aligns him with one of two contending schools regarding the origin of 
ideas. It has long been the problem of philosophy to determine the 
source of ideas which form the basis of thought. Two schools of thought 
which have arisen are innatism, or rationalism, and empiricism.
Empiricism opposes innatism. The innatists profess that ideas, such 
as the archetypes of Plato, already exist in our minds and sensation is 
only necessary to realize them. The empiricists hold that there are no
innate ideas; everything comes from experience. Man, however, feels|
that there is a connection between cause and effect. The problem of 
the empiricists, then, is to account for the association of ideas— how 
does man arrive at concepts in a world of change? Berkeley uses theism; 
God orders the ideas in our mind. But, lacking proof of the existence 
of God, a rigorous sceptic finds this an unacceptable explanation. In 
place of God, Hume argues that the customary transition of the imagina-
9
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tion from one object to its usual attendant implants this feeling in man’s 
mind.(Enquiries, p. 75).
Man does not know the true nature of existence. As Shelley says in 
the Defence when he states a basic tenet of Hume’s philosophy, "We know 
no more of cause and effect than a constant conjunction of events" (VII, 
p. 119). We cannot see beyond the appearances of things. For example, 
never perceiving the actual link between cause and effect, man cannot see 
how the impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second: 
"This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels 
no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects . . . "  
(Enquiries, p. 63).
Because objects only present an appearance to our senses, Hume calls 
our sense-data "impressions," a term which Shelley also uses. In the 
Defence Shelley calls impressions which have been elaborated into per­
ceptions and then into conceptions "images,1' thus retaining the sense 
that man only knows the appearances of things:
The savage . . . expresses the emotions produced in him by
surrounding objects in a similar manner; and language and 
gesture, together with plastic and pictorial imitation,
1 become the image of the combined effect of those objects, and
of his apprehension of them. (VII, p. 110)
In the first moments of perception man is aware only of sensations. 
Primary sensations are not organized in the mind. It is not until later 
that they are elaborated into perceptions and, subsequently, into con­
ceptions. The child, which Shelley uses in numerous essays as an 
example of man in his origins, makes no distinction between itself and 
the external world around it. A child at first has an intense aware­
ness of life. There is no distinction between consciousness and the 
unconscious at this stage. All of the impressions of its earliest forms
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of experience are stored in the mind as latent ideas.
The imagination is the mental power which revives ideas from the 
unconscious storehouse. Sensible impressions which appear similar are 
seen to recur and are associated in the mind. This association takes 
place when an object, presented again to our memory or senses, causes 
the imagination to revive its correlative idea. This concurrence of 
views reinforces the idea more strongly on the imagination. Eventually, 
a feeling of expectation develops which distinguishes between ideas 
revived by the senses and fictions of the imagination. This entire 
activity is uncontrolled by man; in fact, a passive mind makes a more 
fertile soil for the implanting of associations.
Hume uses the example of a billiard ball rolling toward another on 
a smooth table to illustrate how a feeling of expectation develops in 
man. He states that in man's first observation of a billiard ball rol­
ling toward another, he is unable to predict the effect. It is only 
after impulse is imparted to the second ball that he knows a causal re­
lation. The frequent recurrence of this conjunction of events leads 
the mind to expect a similar effect from similar causes. If a man sees 
a billiard ball rolling toward another, the conception that it will stop 
upon contact implies no inherent contradiction. But this conception 
feels very differently from the conception of motion being imparted to 
the second ball.^
This conditioning gives man foresight. When a billiard ball is seen 
rolling towards another his thought goes forward in imagination to anti-
10 The idea of motion being imparted to the second ball is a matter 
of probability not of fact; the ball could equally well bounce off the 
second ball, fly into the air, etc. Knowledge only extends to that 
which has the highest probability.
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cipate experience and in doing so it finds nature confirming its venture. 
Nature implants an instinct in man and, although he is ignorant of the 
powers and forces which govern nature, he finds that his thoughts and 
conceptions have still gone on in the same train with the other works 
of nature (Enquiries, pp. 54-55). "Here, then, is a kind of pre-estab­
lished harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our 
ideas . . . "  (Enquiries, p. 54).
In the Defence- Shelley, explaining how poetry, which he calls the 
"expression of the imagination," is created, gives an interpretation of 
the imagination similar to Hume’s:
Man is an instrument over which a series of external and 
internal impressions are driven, like the alternations of an 
ever-changing wind over an AEolian lyre, which move it by 
their motion to ever-changing melody. But there is a prin­
ciple within the human being, and perhaps within all sentient 
beings, which acts otherwise than in the lyre, and produces 
not melody alone, but harmony, by an internal adjustment of 
the sounds or motion's thus excited to the impressions which 
excite them. (VII, p. 109)
The lyre metaphor appeals to the Romantic poets because the melody is
not played by man, but by nature. Nature is the musician and man the
instrument. The first sentence of the quotation implies that man plays
a passive role when he receives impressions, a suggestion which is
borne out in other works of Shelley. For example, "Mont Blanc" refers
to the imprinting of impressions as,
My own, my human mind, which passively 
Now renders and receives fast influencings,
Holding an unremitting interchange
With the clear universe of things around . . . .
(11. 37-40)
The mind also "passively . . . renders . . . influencings . . . ". This 
means that when an object is present to the memory or senses the imagina­
tion acts independently of man’s conscious will.
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Man seems subject to playing an ever-changing melody, reflecting 
the constant change around him, but the remainder of the lyre metaphor 
makes clear that he is capable of a response. A "principle" within him, 
the imagination, creates harmony by exciting "sounds or motions" which 
are similar to the impression. My interpretation of this, following 
Hume, is that the imagination revives ideas which are similar to the 
impressions. These ideas are accompanied by emotions, the feelings of 
expectation implanted in man by his observation of the "constant conjunc­
tion of events" in nature.
The "principle" within man produces harmony by "an internal adjust­
ment," In his first draft of this passage Shelley had said that this was 
an "instinctive adjustment" (VII, p. 352). Instinct is a term which Hume 
also uses to explain this operation of the imagination: "^Nature] has
. . . implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in 
a correspondent course to that which she has established among external 
objects . . . "  (Enquiries, p. 56). Similarly, in "On the Punishment of 
Death," Shelley says that a "feeling" is "implanted" by the "habitual 
perception" of an action (VI, p. 189).
Although the imagination seems free to combine, take apart, and 
produce ideas in any order at all, it is actually determined by our very 
human nature to operate in certain regular ways. As Shelley says 
further in the Defence, "It is as if the lyre could accomodate its chords 
to the motions of that which strikes them, in a determined proportion of 
sound" (VII, p. 109). Mental customs are dispositions engendered by the 
working together of human nature with the nature which is beyond us but 
of which we are still an integral part.
It is to be noticed that both Shelley and Hume have defined the
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imagination in the foregoing examples as being the correlating factor 
which revives latent ideas from the unconscious storehouse and relates 
them to present impressions. Both men are concerned with man's inabili­
ty to know the true nature of existence, because of his inability to see 
beyond the appearances of things. But man does acquire definite habits 
of causal inference due to the operation of the imagination.
The imagination has command over all the ideas in the mind. This 
range of the imagination makes it the most efficient power for reviving 
ideas which are correlative to the impressions. This is a kind of 
sensory judgment as the ideas are revived by nature. Since these ideas 
are in harmony with nature, Hume calls them ‘'ideas of judgment" (En­
quiries , p . 49) .
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CHAPTER II
THE REASON AND THE DISSOCIATION OF IDEAS
Imagination, the creative faculty, creates the ideas which form the
basis of thought by the process of association. Therefore all the ideas 
in the mind have an essential unity. Reason, the analytic faculty, can 
only consider relations between ideas already created by the imagination. 
It thus has a secondary role. The Defence states that reasoners "follow 
the footsteps of poets, and copy the sketches of their creations into 
the book of common life" (VII, p. 132); and that "Reason is the enumera­
tion of quantities already known" (VII, p* 109).
Reason is considered as "mind contemplating the relations borne by 
one thought to another" (Defence, VII, p. 109) for the purpose of deter­
mining "what thoughts are most invariably subservient to the security and 
happiness of life" ("Speculations on Metaphysics," VII, p. 60). When
reason analyzes the ideas created by the imagination, it divides them into
parts, substituting traits for the whole. The traits, in turn, are taken
to define ideas as a whole and their "integral unity" is forgotten. A
gradual separation between internal and external takes place and man 
eventually submits to the "external" form of things.
Man can not discover the effect a priori from its cause, because he 
never perceives the reality behind appearances (Enquiries, p. 30). He 
is totally dependent upon experience for knowledge. Because of the uni­
formity of events in nature, his mind acquires determined habits of men­
tal action. We believe that we know the actual connection between cause
15 -
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
1 6
and effect, Thus, although necessity occurs only as a mental determina­
tion upon experiencing certain impressions, we have a tendency to locate 
this mental event in the observed events, and to think of it as occurring 
there with the events, even though it is actually taking place in our 
minds.
' This inherent fallacy in all reasoning of taking premises for fact 
leads to errors in speculation. Man reasons from these facts, believing 
that he knows the true nature of existence. This belief creates the 
distinction between internal and external. The idea of a necessary con­
nection between events is only internal. Considering necessity as ex- 
I
ternal is the inherent source of man’s errors in speculation. "Specula­
tions on Metaphysics" alludes to this problem:
Aristotle and his followers, Locke and most of the modern 
Philosophers gave Logic the name of Metaphysics. Nor have 
those who are accustomed to profess the greatest veneration 
for the inductive system of Lord Bacon adhered with suffi­
cient scrupulousness to its regulations. They have professed 
indeed (and who have not professed?) to deduce their conclu­
sions from indisputable facts. How came many of those facts 
to be called indisputable? What sanctioning correspondence 
unites a concatenation of syllogisms? Their promises of 
deducing all systems from facts has too often been performed 
by appealing in favour of these pretended realities to the 
obstinate preconceptions of the multitude; or by the most 
i  preposterous mistake of a name for a thing.^
(VII, p. 63)
Shelley, in Queen Mab, one of his early poems, commits the error of
locating necessity in external nature, an error which Frank B. Evans 
12points out. Both Shelley and his mentor, Godwin, assert that the
11 Locke is included because of his too great concern with words.
12 Frank B. Evans, "Shelley, Godwin, Hume, and the Doctrine of 
Necessity," Studies in Philology, XXXVII (1940), 632-40. Godwin in
his book, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, closely follows Hume, 
and Shelley, Godwin. . Evans picks out parallel passages to show the 
similarities between the three. Godwin in many places even uses the
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necessity of causation inheres in the structure of reality. They become 
dogmatic about the doctrine, giving it the status of a science. In his 
discussion of necessity in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, God­
win declares that the causes of a human's actions can be known:
He who affirms that all actions are necessary, means that, if 
we form a just and, complete view of all the circumstances in 
which a living or intelligent being is placed, we shall find 
that he could not in any moment of his existence have acted 
otherwise than he has acted. According to this assertion 
there is in the transactions of mind nothing loose, precari­
ous and uncertain.
Shelley, following Godwin, says in Queen Mab:
Were the doctrine of Necessity false, the human mind would no 
longer be a legitimate object of science. . . . The precise 
character and motives of any man on any occasion being given, 
the moral philosopher could predict his actions with as much 
certainty as the natural philosopher could predict the effects 
of the mixture of any particular chemical substances.
(I, p. 144)
Shelley places faith in the infallibility of the senses and reason:
The senses are the sources of all knowledge to the mindj 
consequently their evidence claims the strongest assent,,
The decision of the mind, founded upon our own experience, 
derived from these sources, claims the next degree.
(Queen Mab, I, p. 146)
One scene in Queen Mab symbolically places passion below reason:
Reason was free; and wild though Passion went 
Through tangled glens and wood-embosomed meads,
Gathering a garland of the strangest flowers,
Yet like the bee returning to her queen,
She bound the sweetest on her sister's brow 
Who meek and sober kissed the sportive child,
No longer trembling at the broken rod.
(IX, 11. 50-56)
same examples as Hume. Evans also shows that Godwin led Shelley to Hume, 
for certain passages in the notes to Queen Mab are not in Godwin, but 
are found in Hume.
13 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, in Prose 
of the Romantic Period, ed. Carl R. Woodring (Boston, 1961), p. 19,
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Since Shelley's assertion of the doctrine of Necessity as a rigorous 
science enables him to unveil the cause of evil, he is also able to sug­
gest the cure:
How can we take the benefits and reject the evils of the 
system, which is now interwoven with all the fibres of our 
being?— I believe that abstinence from animal food and spiri- 
tous liquors would in a great measure capacitate us for the 
solution of this important question.
(Queen Mab, I, p. 159)
Shelley later drops his advocacy of vegetarianism in his poetry, no doubt 
because of his awareness that the cause of evil lay deeper.
Shelley advocated vegetarianism because he felt that man had devia­
ted from nature by eating flesh. He also included air pollution, crowded 
cities, and the "muffling of our bodies in superfluous apparel" (Queen 
Mab, I, p. 159) as causes of evil. Once he realized that the course of 
nature was less easily known, he discarded this line of reasoning. He 
was really only blaming the effects of evil rather than the cause.
His faith in reason enables Shelley to state exactly in Queen Mab 
what the cause of evil is, but, later, the problem of assigning specific 
causes to specific effects becomes more difficult. Hume's attitude 
toward the doctrine of necessity is sceptical, in keeping with his philo­
sophy. He denies any certainty of knowledge due to reason and the senses. 
Shelley gradually tends toward Hume's position that it is impossible to 
know rationally the actual principle of connection between cause and 
effect.
Another significant distinction which Shelley makes between reason 
and imagination is that the former is a conscious power and the latter, 
unconscious. We find in the Defence that poetry, the "expression of the 
imagination," is "not like reasoning, a power to be exerted according to
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the determination of the will" (VII, p. 135); and, a few pages later, 
"Poetry . . .  in this respect differs from logic, that it is not subject 
to the control of the . . . consciousness or will" (VII, p. 138). As 
"the mind in creation is as a fading coal" (Defence', VII, p. 135), its 
conceptions fade more and more as we consciously try to recapture them. 
Thus, because the reason is not able to recollect all the events asso­
ciated with an object or action, its judgments are prone to be erroneous.
Originally, in the early stages of man's mental development, there 
is no distinction between the two levels of consciousness, a condition 
described in "On Life":
Let us recollect our sensations as children. What a 
distinct and intense apprehension had we of the world and of
ourselves! Many of the circumstances of social life were
then important to us which are now no longer so. . . . W e  
less habitually distinguished all that we saw and felt, from 
ourselves. They seemed as it were to constitute one mass.
There are some persons who, in this respect, are always chil­
dren. Those who are subject to the state called reverie,
.feel as if their nature were dissolved into the surrounding 
universe, or as if the surrounding universe were absorbed 
into their being. They are conscious of no distinction. And 
these are states which precede, or accompany, or follow an 
unusually intense and vivid apprehension of life. As men 
grow up this power commonly decays and they become mechani­
cal and habitual agents. Thus feelings and then reasonings 
are the combined result of a multitude of entangled thoughts, 
and of a series of what are called impressions, planted by 
reiteration. (VI, pp. 195-196)
Man, habituated to existence, "fills out" his previously empty conscious­
ness of an object. This "represents a logically distinct kind of con-
14sciousness, not some flow of feeling." Man then makes a distinction 
between external and internal which leads him to assume that objects 
are entities in themselves. Believing that he knows the actual thing 
itself, man ends up consciously adjusting himself to an "external" exis-
14 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (New York, 1957),
p. 112.
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tence instead of reversing this process, The ability to manipulate
existence is lost and instead of being the shaper, man becomes shaped.
Man, cursing the evils of existence, is only cursing his own creations.
Having lost his intense awareness of life, man forgets that things
exist as they are perceived. "The mind is its own place, and in its
15self/ Can make a Heav’n of Hell a Hell of- Heav'n." In many places in 
his work Shelley refers to man’s belief that the necessity of causation 
inheres in the structure of the universe and that things exist in them­
selves as a "veil" which obscures from him the true nature of existence.
When man reasons, his consciousness exercises a tyranny over his 
unconscious and he is less capable of an imaginative response:
. . . Thought can with difficulty visit the intricate and 
winding chambers which it inhabits. It is like a river whose 
rapid and perpetual stream flows outwards . . . .  The caverns 
of the mind are obscure, and shadowy; or pervaded with a 
lustre, beautifully bright indeed, but shining not beyond
their portals. If it were possible to be where we have been,
vitally and indeed— if, at the moment of our presence there, 
we could define the results of our experience,— if the pas­
sage from sensation to reflection— from a state of passive 
perception to voluntary contemplation, were not so dizzying 
and so tumultuous, this attempt would be less difficult.
("Speculations on Metaphysics,"
VII, p. 64)
The revival of latent ideas by the imagination is involuntary. The rea­
son, which is voluntary and conscious, does not have this command over
the storehouse of ideas. Reason would thus miss the peculiar nature of
an action in tending to fit impressions to preconceptions.
Using reason, man assumes that the future will conform to the past,
15 Shelley uses this quotation in the Defence (VII, p. 137). Com­
pare: Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus:
Faust. How comes it, then, that thou art out of hell?
Meph. Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it . . ..
(Ill, 11. 87-88)
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narrowing his range of thought. The reasoner, like Procrustes, usually 
makes actions fit his preconceptions, whether they do or not. Habit, 
leading man to believe that cause, inheres in nature, causes him to take 
a fatalistic attitude toward life. By accepting events as inevitable, he
loses his spontaneity as his imaginative response becomes duller and
duller. Without the imaginative response there is no accompanying feeling
and, thus, less able to determine the value of his thoughts, man is
prone to commit error.
Several of Shelley's works state that man escapes the tyranny of the
consciousness if he has a passive state of mind. This mental condition
is best engendered by not distinguishing between the present and the
past and, as "On the Punishment of Death" states, it is found in all
those not yet dulled by society:
The savage and the illiterate are but faintly aware of the 
distinction between the future and the past; they make actions 
belonging to periods so distinct, the subjects of similar 
feelings . . . .  (VI, p. 189)
In the infancy of society, according to the Defence, every author is 
"necessarily a poet" (VII, p. Ill), because the imaginative response is 
unbound. The consciousness does not exert a control and the mind is in 
its freest state to respond to impressions.
Since man cannot trust his own reasoning, he needs to live always 
in the present. Then the mind is more able to render the correct res­
ponse to the present impressions. Since nature is in continual change, 
the organization of the subconscious storehouse never ends. This organ­
ization can take place more easily with a passive frame of mind. This 
is the passive interchange which the passage in "Mont Blanc," mentioned 
earlier, describes. By relying on reason, the mind is too fatalistically
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orientated and the imaginative response is smothered,
Due to the effect of custom, the imaginative response is attended 
with a feeling which helps man to determine the value of his ideas. The 
experience of a strong feeling assures him that nature will confirm the 
venture of his thought when it goes forward in imagination to anticipate 
experience. This foresight gives man a degree of security in a world in 
which he is subjected continually to the ’’accident of surrounding impres­
sions" (Defence, VII, p. 137)* Man's unconscious response to "impressions" 
is more in harmony with "nature" or "society" than his conscious response
is ever capable of.
Considering the roles assigned to imagination and reason in the 
Defence, we see that it negates Peacock's thesis in The Four Ages of 
Poetry. Peacock argues that the advance of knowledge and reason propor­
tionately circumscribes the subject matter of poetry, for superstition, 
which excites the passions of man, is dispelled, and what was formerly 
expressed by poetry is now better said by prose. Shelley defeats Pea­
cock's attack by showing that it is possible to doubt the certainty of 
knowledge, and if knowledge is uncertain, then reason is not infallible.
The reason is necessary to determine which thoughts can be made 
subservient to the needs of man, but the mystery remains despite man's 
quantitative measurements. Since the true nature of existence is not 
known, the imagination, with its access to the record imprinted by na­
ture on the minds of men, gives man a modicum of security in a world of 
change. Poets, expressing the influence of society or nature upon their 
mind, may only create a "reflected image" of the "agencies of the invisi­
ble world," but there is a certain order in their creations which is 
"indestructible" (Defence, VII, p. 109). Man may only be capable of
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creating "superstitions," but because of the order reflected in his 
expressions, "all original religions are allegorical or susceptible of 
allegory, and, like Janus, have a double face of false and true" (De­
fence , VII, p. 112).
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CHAPTER III
MAN'S SOCIAL INSTINCTS 
"Speculations on Metaphysics" and "Speculations on Morals" describe 
the development of man’s awareness of his fellow man. The ideas con­
tained in these two works are similar to those in the Defence. The sig­
nificance of this aspect of Shelley's philosophy is that relations 
between men implant a number of instincts much in the same way that 
nature does. These instincts, peculiar to man's social nature, are cal­
led "social sympathies" (Defence, VII, p. 110).
The Defence explains that the social sympathies "begin to develop 
themselves from the moment that two human beings coexist . . . "  (VII, 
p. 110). They are another set of principles, in addition to those im­
planted by nature, which determine man's will into action (Defence, VII, 
p.. 110). Since man is a "social animal," he expresses not only the influ­
ence of nature on his mind, but also of society. The social sympathies, 
learned entirely by experience, develop because man in society, "with 
all his passions and his pleasures, next becomes the object of the pas­
sions and pleasures of man; an additional class of emotions produces an 
augmented treasure of expressions" (Defence, VII, p. 110).
"Speculations on Metaphysics" explains how the social sympathies 
develop. It states that we are "intuitively conscious" of our own 
existence, and "of that connection in the train of our successive ideas, 
which we term our identity" (VII, p. 61). But since we do not know the 
true nature of existence, our awareness of our fellow human beings is
24
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"founded upon a very complicated relation of ideas . , , " (VII, p. 61). 
This awareness would have to be developed by the cultivation of the ima­
gination. Because of the effect of custom, ideas are associated in the 
mind. These ideas are revived by the imagination when a similar object 
is presented again to the senses. Finally, we experience a "periodical 
recurrence of masses of ideas, which our own voluntary determinations 
have, in one peculiar direction, no power to circumscribe or to arrest, 
and against the recurrence of which they can only imperfectly provide" 
(VII, p. 61).
We gradually become aware of "living beings in our own shape, and 
in shapes more or less analogous to our own" (VII, p. 61). This is the 
first stage of our awareness of our fellow beings. The second stage, as 
"Speculations on Morals" goes on to explain next, takes place when "ac­
cents and gestures" of these shapes are "referred to the feelings which 
they express" (VII, p. 75). Thus, we become aware that there are crea­
tures similar to ourselves which experience kindred feelings..
It is significant that man measures "external" existence by referring 
to his own feeling. We can only recognize a fellow creature by referring 
to our own feelings. If we see a creature, similar to ourselves, sig­
nalling pleasure or pain with actions similar to our own, we recognize it 
as human. A similar criterion measures events in nature. A conception, 
revived by some event in nature, is accompanied by a feeling. Thus, we 
have some security that a certain event will follow. This feeling is 
due to the response implanted in man by nature. Man’s only point of 
stability in a world of change is a pleasurable or painful feeling. Be­
cause there is no essential distinction between thoughts, "Speculations 
on Metaphysics" states that important distinctions of various degrees of
.199569
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force are to be established between them if they are to be "subjects of 
ethical and oeconomical discussion" (VII, p, 60),
Along with his developing awareness of other men, man gains an 
awareness of what is good and evil regarding human relations. "Specula- 
tions on Morals" provides important background to this aspect of Shelley's 
philosophy. Significantly in that work he says that the "benevolent pro­
pensities are inherent in the human mind" (VII, p. 77). "A human being 
such as is man considered in his origin, a child a month old, has a very 
imperfect consciousness of the existence of other natures resembling it­
self" ("Speculations on Morals," VII, p. 74). It is entirely preoccupied 
with extinguishing the "pains with which it is perpetually assailed" (VII, 
pp. 74-75)« "That is called good which produces pleasure; that is called 
evil which produces pain" (VII, p. 73).
As soon as the child/man in his origins becomes aware of the exis­
tence of its fellow men by referring "accents and gestures" significant 
of pain to the feelings that they suggest, it desires that these pains 
in its fellow creature should cease too (VII, p. 75). Since the child/ 
man in his origins naturally desires the extinction of its own pains, the 
extension of this attitude to its fellow creature is also instinctive.
Since "pain is . . . apprehended to be evil for its own sake, with­
out any other necessary reference to the mind by which s existence is 
perceived than] such as is indispensible to its perception" (VII, p. 75), 
there is no need for abstract rules to govern relations between men. An 
intense apprehension of subtle signs of human feeling is deemed more im­
portant. Chapter II, Section ii, of "Speculations on Morals" advises that 
"Moral Science Consists in Considering the Difference, not the Resemblance, 
of Persons" (VII, p. 81). Man has too long based law on the resemblances.
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Man, not knowing the true nature of existence, must test his obser­
vations by referring to his own feelings.’ Solitary man is selfish, for 
his mind is "incapable of receiving an accurate intimation of the na­
ture of pain as existing in beings resembling itself" ("Speculations on 
Morals," VII, p. 75). But in society, when he learns to "acutely sym­
pathise with the sufferings and enjoyments of others" (VII, p. 75), he 
will avoid those actions which cause pain and pursue those which cause 
pleasure. His moral progress depends upon an extension of his own feelings 
into the world around him.
An alert perception of subtle nuances of expression would awaken 
fully man’s mind to the vast range of feelings which his fellow man is 
capable of. He can learn to sympathize fully with his fellow man by 
empathy, putting himself in the place of others. He also enlarges the 
circumference of his imagination by familiarizing himself with poetry and 
philosophy, the records of the varieties of human experience.^
Man's relationship with his fellow man, the realm of morality and 
the one area in which he can control good or evil, can be seen as two 
concentric circles. The inner circle represents those closest to him.
Man, not knowing the true nature of existence, must test his observations 
by referring to his own feelings. It is relatively easy to recognize 
the signs which are significant of good or evil in the inner group; plea­
sure or pain are as evident as a smile or a grimace. Benevolence thus 
comes easily in a situation where man can immediately measure the feelings 
of his fellow beings.
However, the outer circle, including a much larger number of people,
16 Shelley makes this suggestion in both "Speculations on Morals,"
VII, p. 75, and A Defence of Poetry, VII, p. 117.
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presents a problem to man's powers of observation, Man is led by his 
benevolent propensities to regard every human being indifferently with 
whom he comes into contact. But the benevolent propensities "have pre­
ference only with respect to those who offer themselves most obviously to
[hisj notice" ("Speculations on Morals," VII, p. 77).
Human beings are indiscriminating and blind; they will avoid 
inflicting pain, though that pain should be attended with 
eventual benefit; they will seek to confer pleasure without 
calculating the mischief that.may result. They benefit one
at the expense of many. ("Speculations on Morals," VII, p. 77)
It is difficult to tell if an action which benefits a member in the inner 
circle of relationships does not ultimately cause pain to the group as a 
whole. Man can no longer depend upon his immediate feelings of benevo­
lence as excited by an empathy with those nearest to him. To fully bring 
about pleasure to the group as a whole, an Utilitarian principle which is 
part of Shelley's philosophy, man must cultivate his imagination by a 
careful observation of the consequences of his actions. A greater ex­
tension of man's feelings into the surrounding universe is required to 
include a much larger group of people.
An essay, "On the Punishment of- Death," describes the cultivation 
of one such "combination" of ideas:
The passion of revenge is originally nothing more than 
an habitual perception of the ideas of the sufferings of the- 
person who inflicts an injury, as connected, as they are in 
a savage state, or in such portions of society as are yet 
undisciplined to civilization, with security that that injury 
will not be repeated in future. This feeling, engrafted upon 
superstition and confirmed by habit, at last loses sight of 
the only object for which it may be supposed to have been 
implanted, and becomes a passion and a duty to be pursued 
and fulfilled, even to the destruction of those ends to which 
it originally tended. (VI, p. 189)
Several ideas in this statement are relevant to my thesis. First is the
fact that the social sympathies are engendered by an "habitual percep-
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tion" and, secondly, that this involves the implanting of a "feeling" 
which would distinguish between good ideas and evil ones.
Thirdly, the fact that the consequences of actions have to be 
noted, implies that the mind cannot determine, in the first occurrence 
of an action, its moral tenour. One person injures another. The cri­
minal is punished and the effects duly noted. The punishment should have 
a salutary effect. If it does not, its future application in an iden­
tical situation should be more severe-or less. A process of experimen­
tation is necessary to determine the proper proportion of punishment to 
mete out.^^ The habitual perception of these actions cultivates the 
imagination. "Speculations on Morals," describing a similar process, 
states that "The imagination thus acquires by exercise a habit as it 
were of perceiving and abhorring evil" (VII, p. 75). As the Defence 
states, the imagination is, thus, not only the author of "language, 
colour, and form," but of "religious and civil habits of action" (VII, 
p. 113).
The discovery that punishment may ultimately be beneficial, that it 
may be applied as a means of moral improvement, is probably accidental at 
first. Man in his origin would exist in a rude state for many years be­
fore the organization of his unconscious finally lifts him out of his 
savage condition. Eventually, however, acute observers, noting the 
effects of certain actions and by using trial and error, would learn how 
to fit means to ends which are desirable. The habitual perception of
17 See also "Speculations on Morals"; "It is in the due apprecia­
ting the general effects of their peculiarities, and in cultivating the 
habit of acquiring decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising 
out of £them] in particular cases, that the the most important part of 
moral science consists (VII, p. 82). The reference is to the actions of 
men.
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those actions which successfully achieve the effects desired should re~ 
sult in a reinforcement of those views on the mind, and create a feeling 
of expectation which would enable man to determine the value of his judg­
ment. '
Once the combination of ideas has been implanted, the antecedent 
ones revive their correlatives, and feeling determines their good or evil 
nature. Thus man develops foresight, due to the cultivation of the ima- 
gination, which gives him control over the consequences of his actions. 
"Imagination or mind employed in prophetically [imaging forth] its objects 
is that faculty of human nature on which every gradation of its progress, 
nay, every, the minutest change depends" ("Speculations on Morals," VII, 
p. 75).
Man has to perceive subtle variations in human behaviour, not only 
for the imagination to revive correlative ideas effectively, but to con­
tinue the process of cultivating the imagination. Shelley stresses the 
importance of intensely apprehending the present, designating anyone who 
has this capability, a poet:
For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and 
discovers those laws according to which present things ought 
to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and 
his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of
latest time. (Defence, VII, p. 112)
A few lines before this passage, Shelley states, "To be a poet is to appre-
h en d the true and the beautiful, in a word, the good which exists in
the relation, subsisting, first between existence and perception, and
secondly between perception and expression" (VII, pp. 111-112).
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CHAPTER IV
MAN'S DISSOCIATED SENSIBILITY AND EVIL 
All of the creations of the imagination have an "integral unity".
For example, originally, the habit of revenge was the idea of punishment 
leading to some beneficial effect. Man acts out of disinterested bene­
volence and an imaginative response determines the proportion of punish­
ment to apply in any particular case. Gradually, however, man's feelings 
which determine the value of his imaginative response and guide his 
judgment, degenerate into passions, a breakdown which "On the Punishment 
of Death" describes:
This feeling, engrafted upon superstition and confirmed by 
habit, at last loses sight of the only object for which it 
may be supposed to have been implanted, and becomes a passion 
and a duty to be pursued and fulfilled, even^go the destruction 
of those ends to which it originally tended.
(VI, p. 189)
Through repetition, man forgets the qualitative value of punishment. 
He punishes for its own sake, forgetting its legitimate end. The feeling 
becomes a passion and man a mechanical and habitual agent. His reason, 
a conscious power, considering the relations between ideas, is unable to 
recall all the ideas associated with a particular event. Certain quali­
ties are taken as defining the whole and man loses the essential unity
18 Shelley similarly describes the decay of values in "On Life":
"As men grow up . . . they become mechanical and habitual agents. Thus 
feelings and then reasonings are the combined result of a multitude of 
entangled thoughts, and of a series of what are called impressions, 
planted by reiteration" (VI., p. 196).
31
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of the ideas. In the case of revenge, punishment becomes the quality
which defines the habit as a whole: .
. . . Their daily occupations constraining them to a precise 
form in all their thoughts, they come to connect inseparably 
the idea of their own advantage with that of the death and 
torture of others. ("On the Punishment of Death," VI, pp. 188-
189)
Man then applies punishment with no respect to its end. Other erroneous 
excesses would present a similar decay of values and separation between 
reason and imagination.
If man does not distinguish between the future and the past but 
lives intensely in the present, he would regard each event as different 
from another. He would not give any preference to any particular course 
of action, but, instead, all the particular events comprehended in the 
present action would be rendered entirely equal. This is the nature of 
chance and our ignorance of the real cause of any event should beget its 
influence on the understanding (Enquiries, pp. 56-57). As "Speculations 
on Morals" says, "In truth, no one action has, when considered in its 
whole extent, an essential resemblance with any other" (VII, p: 81).
If man has this passive mental condition, his imagination is free 
to render an imaginative response.. "On the Punishment of Death" cites 
the savage and the illiterate, those who are still not dulled by society, 
as having the freest mental condition:
The savage and the illiterate are but faintly aware of 
the distinction between the future and the past; they make 
actions belonging to periods so distinct, the subjects of 
similar feelings; they live only in the present, or.' in the 
past, as it is present. It is in this that the philosopher 
excels one of the many; it is this which distinguishes the 
doctrine of philosophic necessity from fatalism; and that 
determination of the will, by which it is the active source 
of future events, from that liberty or indifference, to which 
the abstract liability of irremediable actions is attached, 
according to the notions of the vulgar. (VI, p. 189)
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Evil results when man consciously attempts to fit means to ends:
This is the source of the erroneous excesses of Remorse
and Revenge; the one extending itself over the future, and
the other over the past; provinces in which their suggestions 
can only be the sources of evil. The purpose of a resolution 
to act more wisely and virtuously in future, and the sense of 
a necessity of caution in repressing an enemy, are the sources 
from which the enormous superstitions implied in the words 
cited have arisen. ("On the Punishment of Death," VI, p. 189)
"Ode to Liberty" describes creations of the imagination as "winged
sound[s]" which soar "where Expectation never flew,/ Rending the veil of
space and time asunder!" (11. 84-86).
Once man becomes habituated, he judges in terms of the past; his
judgment is conscious, not unconscious. The present event may not fit
his preconception and he may punish unjustly. This characteristic of
the mind overshooting the mark for which it aims is the cause of the
erroneous excesses in man’s reasoning ("On the Punishment of Death,"
VI, p. 189). When thought is constrained to a precise form, the mind
is not free to respond imaginatively.
The uniformity of events observable in nature leads man to follow a
similar uniformity in his actions (Enquiries, Sect. VIII, Part I, pp. 80-
96). The actions of men are thus grouped or categorized and the peculiar
S
nature of actions is missed. Therefore, the correct imaginative response 
is not possible. For example, when a criminal commits a crime he is 
simply punished in response to a fixed law which may not fit the parti­
cular case. Only the imagination, with power over all the ideas in the 
mind, can respond efficiently to the peculiar nature of the case. A 
conscious attempt to fit means to ends may be the cause of injustice.
Chapter II, ii, of "Speculations on Morals," claiming that "no one 
action has, when considered in its whole extent, an essential resemblance
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with any other," argues that moral progress depends upon noting differ­
ences in human actions, not their similarities (VII, p. 81). Subtle 
differences in human actions have to be noted in order to refer them to 
the correct feeling which they suggest. In this way the cultivation of 
the imagination, which is a continual process, can take place.
Reasoners, copying the creations of poets into the book of common 
life, forget that poets are only expressing their own mental determina­
tion and locate this mental determination in nature. The expression of 
the poet, which is only an "image" of the surrounding objects, becomes 
fixed. Reasoners, considering only the quantitative value of thoughts, 
forget the qualitative. Calculations based on these quantities lead to 
error when reasoners fail to accommodate them to our inner nature.
Calculations have to be accommodated to man's inner nature according 
to the pleasure-pain principle. The effects of each calculation must be 
noted so that it can be adjusted in order to bring about the desired 
pleasurable effect. In the act of revenge man only gradually learns 
through experience the degree of punishment to apply which benefits 
society as a whole. His imagination, cultivated through an habitual 
perception, can then give him a degree of certainty in his actions.
Lancelot Law Whyte in his book The Next Development in Man describes 
the effect of the failure to accommodate analytical reasoning to the inner 
nature of man:
The essential feature of laissez faire was the assumption that 
the automatic operation of the quantity symbols, through the 
actions of individuals organizing their behaviour by^geans of 
them, would lead to the satisfaction of human needs.
19 Lancelot Law Whyte, The Next Development in Man (New York, 1950),
p. 116.
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The evil in this system was the fact that it did not provide for the
"catharsis of rhythmic relaxation or satisfying achievement." Man was
left instead "perpetually lusting for more."
Another nought on an order, and the worldwide machinery of 
credit operated without scrutiny of purpose or result, and 
thousands more were able to live or compelled to die, to work 
more or less, to g^perience once again the instability of 
their employment.
Shelley pointed out this same principle in the Defence. He states 
that reason, which has "enlarged the limits of the empire of man over 
the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportional­
ly circumscribed those of the internal world" (VII, p. 134). There is 
more "scientific and economical knowledge than can be accommodated to the 
just distribution of the produce which it multiplies" (VII, p. 134). New 
model cars are poured out without consideration of the benefit of society 
as a whole. The unjust distribution of produce creates selfishness and 
inequality, which in turn breed other evils:
To what but a cultivation of the mechanical arts in a degree 
disproportioned to the presence of the creative faculty, which 
is the basis of all knowledge, is to be attributed the abuse 
of all invention for abridging and combining labour, to the 
exasperation of the inequality of mankind? From what other 
cause has it arisen that these inventions which should have 
lightened, have added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam?
(Defence, VII, p. 134)
Thus the imagination gap in man's reasoning resulted in the evils of the 
Industrial Revolution.
The machine is something new to man. Since its operation is not
instinctive to man's nature, he must learn from experience, observing
carefully the consequences of his actions. After habitually perceiving
an action for a period of time he develops a feeling which helps him to
determine the relation between production and its effect. This wisdom
20 Whyte, p. 116.
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gives foresight which guides his future actions.
Man has long held the belief that reason is the more useful faculty. 
But Shelley debates this point in the Defence. When man considers the 
value of anything he usually refers to utilitarian purposes, thinking 
only in terms of the limited sense of what is useful in order to satisfy 
his animal nature. The imagination creates all of man's ideas; reason 
only considers those which can be subservient to his needs, without 
accommodating the idea to man's inner nature. The imagination shows the 
most useful habits man can follow in accommodating the invention to his 
needs. We have to know where we have been before we know where we are 
going and only the imagination can efficiently determine this.
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CHAPTER V
THE PERPETUATION OF EVIL '
The tyranny of signs over the mind of man perpetuates the evil which
infects society. Names such as "KING" and "PRIEST" are the "sperm/ Of
what makes life foul, cankerous, and abhorred . . . "  ("Ode to Liberty,"
11. 222-223). Shelley wonders why man does not rise up and throw down
the symbols of power.
Oh that the free would stamp the impious name
Of KING into the dust . . . .
. . . Lift the victory-flashing sword,
And cut the snaky knots of this foul gordian word . . . .
("Ode to Liberty," 11. 211-218)
Shelley’s poetry and prose continually exhort man to throw down signs and
regain imaginative freedom: "This need not be; ye might arise, and will/
That gold should lose its power, and thrones their glory" (The Revolt of
Islam, VIII, xvi, 11. 3334-3335).
Words which represent different habits of action decay in value, a
process Shelley describes in the Defence:
[The language of a poet is] vitally metaphorical; that is, it
marks the before unapprehended relations of things and per­
petuates their apprehension, until the words which represent 
them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of. 
thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts; and then 
if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations 
which have been thus disorganised, language will be dead to 
all the nobler purposes of human intercourse.
(VII, p. Ill)
The word, "aristocracy," represents one such decay in value. Shelley 
points out in A Philosophical View of Reform that the word no longer has
37
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its original meaning;
Since usage has consecrated the distinction of the word aris­
tocracy from its original meaning . . . , Let me be assumed 
to employ the word aristocracy in that ordinary sense which 
signifies that class of persons who possess a right to the 
produce of the labour of others, without dedicating to the 
common service any labour in return, (VII, p. 27)
Once man forgets the qualitative value of habits and words, he has
only a collection of "facts," gordian knots which entangle the mind. The
poetry, the expression of man's imagination, is drained out of science,
politics and religion, and they become "Signs of thought's empire over
thought . . . "  (The Triumph of Life, 1. 211). This is the imagination
gap which Shelley pictures in the Defence:
. . . The presence or absence of poetry in its most poetic and 
universal form, has been found to be connected with good and 
evil in conduct and habit. (VII, pp. 120-121)
According to "Speculations on Morals," "much of the confusion which has 
involved the theory of morals" has been caused by a "common sophism, 
which, like many others, depends upon the abuse of a metaphorical ex­
pression to a literal purpose" (VII, p. 74).
When man submits to an external order which no longer accommodates
the internal, he is prone to commit error. The surface of society, how-
i
ever, is so overspread with the veil of familiarity that, although man
may try to think freely, he is so enmeshed in error that he is unable to
see what is truth, a problem which "Speculations on Morals" points out:
Almost all that which is ostensible submits to that legisla­
ture created by the general representation of the past feelings 
of mankind— imperfect as it is from a variety of causes, as 
it exists in the government, the religion, and domestic habits.
Those who do not nominally, yet actually, submit to the same 
power. The external features of their conduct, indeed, can 
no more escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream 
of the wind; and his opinion, which he often hopes he has 
dispassionately secured from all contagion of prejudice and 
vulgarity, would be found, on examination, to be the inevitable
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excrescence of the very usages from which he vehemently dis­
sents. (.VII, pp. 82-83)
Even a poet in the "intervals of inspiration . . . becomes a man, and is 
abandoned to the sudden reflux of the influence under which others habi­
tually live" (Defence, VII, p. 137).
From the moment of his birth, man learns to fit into the moulds of 
society: "The little Actor cons another part." Man learns to act as if 
he agreed in necessity. This belief is most beneficial in man's relation 
to the physical universe; he sets his alarm clock in expectation that the 
sun will rise on the morrow; but its effect is most pernicious in rela­
tion to morals. Having lost his intense apprehension of reality, his 
spontaneity, he accepts all of his various passions, such as "revenge," 
in their adulterated form. His habit of mind prevents him from question­
ing the intrinsic value of his habits and such things as kings, priests, 
and money. Trained as a soldier, he marches to war, loses a limb, and 
proudly wears his badges. A Philosophical View of Reform refers to war 
as a "kind of superstition; the pageantry of arms and badges corrupts 
the imagination of men" (VII, p. 53).
Dickens in Hard Times laments the lack of poetry in industrialized
!Victorian England. The hard philosophy of utilitarianism demands that 
one remake himself to fit the Procrustean bed of facts. Sissy Jupe, who 
lives with horses, is unable to define one when called upon to do so by 
Gradgrind. For her, the qualitative aspect of horses which she knows 
intimately is inexpressible,. Bitzer, Gradgrind's model pupil who has 
been successfully filled to the brim with facts, easily pours out a des­
cription:
Quadruped. Gramnivorous. Forty teeth, namely, twenty-four 
grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in
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the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs 
hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks 
in mouth.
Dickens exposes the evil of a strict utilitarianism which refuses to ac­
cept the qualitative element•of reality and which attempts to define 
reality in terms of what can be weighed and measured.
Even the doctrines of Christ, as the Defence indicates, become evil 
when man forgets their qualitative value:
Whatever of evil [the Christian doctrines] may have contained 
sprang from the extinction of the poetic principle, connected 
with the progress of despotism and superstition.
(VII, p. 126)
Shelley reminds the reader in A Philosophical View of Reform that a
reading of the New Testament will expose the erroneous excesses of the
established churches:
The New Testament is in everybody's hand, and the few who 
ever read it with the simple sincerity of an unbiassed judg­
ment may perceive how distinct from the opinions of any of 
those professing themselves establishers were the doctrines 
and the actions of Jesus Christ. (VII, p. 8)
The test of an unbiased reading of the New Testament, Shelley goes on to
say, was made during the Reformation and the "then existing hierarchy"
was found wanting. "Ode to Liberty" also refers to this event:
Luther caught thy wakening glance;
Like lightning, from his leaden lance 
Reflected, it dissolved the visions of the trance 
In which, as in a tomb, the nations lay . . . .
(11. 141-144)
The "poetry" in the New Testament recalls man to the original rhythm and 
order of Christianity.
Shelley applauds Berkeley and Hume in A Philosophical View of Reform 
because they
have clearly established the certainty of our ignorance with 
respect to those obscure questions which under the name of
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religious truths have been the watchwords of contention and 
the symbols of unjust power ever since they were distorted by 
the narrow passions of the immediate followers of Jesus from 
that meaning to which philosophers are even now restoring 
them. (VII, p. 9)
The chief role of philosophers, defined in "On Life," is to reduce the 
"mind to that freedom in which it would have acted, but for the misuse 
of words and signs, the instruments of its own creation (VI, p. 195). 
"Speculations on Morals" also suggests a similar role:
The misguided imaginations of men have rendered the as­
certaining of what iŝ  not true, the principle direct service 
which metaphysical enquiry can bestow upon moral science.
Moral science itself is the doctrine of the voluntary actions 
of man, as a sentient and social being. These actions depend 
on the thoughts in his mind. But there is a mass of popular 
opinion, from which the most enlightened persons are seldom 
wholly free, into the truth or falsehood of which it is en­
cumbent on us to enquire before we can arrive at any firm 
conclusions as to the conduct which we ought to pursue in the 
regulation of our own minds, or towards our fellow-beings; or 
before we can ascertain the elementary laws, according to 
which these thoughts, from which these actions flow, are 
originally combined. (VII, p. 71)
Shelley has the usual poet's plaint about the inadequacy of words
for expression. The Defence recognizes, however, that language is su­
perior to other forms of expression, for it
has relation to thoughts alone; but all other materials, in­
struments, and conditions of art, have relations among each 
other, which limit and interpose between conception and ex­
pression. (VII, p. 113)
But some thoughts are too profound for expression. As the "mind in
creation is as a fading coal" (Defence, .VII, p. 135), our consciousness
is unable to conceive of an idea created by the imagination in its full
light; the passage from "passive perception to voluntary contemplation"
is too steep ("Speculations on Metaphysics," VII, p. 64). In Revolt of
Islam, Shelley finds one such conception beyond the power of words;
Like what may be conceived of this vast dome,
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When from the depths which, thought can seldom pierce 
Genius beholds it rise, his native home,
Girt by the deserts of the Universe;
Yet, nor in painting’s light, or mightier verse,
Or sculpture’s marble language, can invest 
That shape to mortal sense— such glooms immerse 
That incommunicable sight, and rest 
Upon the labouring brain and overburdened breast.
(I, L, 11. 568-576)
In "Ode to Liberty," Shelley wishes that the veil drawn by words
would vanish:
Oh, that the words which make the thoughts obscure 
From which they spring, as clouds of glimmering dew 
From a white lake blot Heaven’s blue portraiture,
Were stripped of their thin masks and various hue 
And frowns and smiles and splendours not their own,
Till in the nakedness of false and true
They stand before their Lord, each to receive its due . . . .
(11. 234-240)
Unlike most poets, however, Shelley foresees a time when words will no
longer slide, crack, break or decay under tension. When man finally
"falls" from evil into a state of grace, the event Prometheus Unbound
describes, he will command the universe and language will also come
under his control:
. . . Language is a perpetual Orphic song,
Which rules with Daedal harmony a throng
Of thoughts and forms, which else senseless and shapeless 
i were. (Prometheus Unbound, IV, 11. 415-417)
Shelley prefers the model rather than the rule, for a metaphor
leaves the object intact for others to interpret. Reason, attempting
to describe the action or thing itself, substitutes traits rather than
describing the appearance of the object. Images, such as metaphors or
similes, do not violate the object, but leave it intact.
Poets recreate the world for man. Their poetry
compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that 
which we know. It creates anew the universe, after it has 
been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions
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blunted by reiteration. (Defence, VII, p. 137)
Their language is "vitally metaphorical"'(Defence, VII, p. 111). Instead 
of describing the moon in quantitative terms, they attempt to describe 
its qualities. They do not attempt to name a thing, but leave it unla­
belled. Poets create afresh the associations of words by describing ob­
jects with metaphors (VII, p. Ill), an activity which the Defence states 
is always necessary:
. . . If no new poets should arise to create afresh the asso­
ciations which have been thus disorganised, language will be 
dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse.
(VII, p. Ill)
Men of feeling have arisen throughout history to throw off the un­
necessary yoke of familiarity. Revolutions in Shelley's own day eviden­
ced to him that man need not submit to oppressions he himself had crea­
ted. The 1820 revolution in Spain typically illustrated to Shelley man's 
capacity to regain his freedom, and occasioned the writing of "Ode to 
Liberty." The ode records the physical and moral progress of man, begin­
ning with the creation of the universe. In it Shelley recalls the heights 
and the abysses of man's moral history.
The liberty which Shelley refers to is a freedom to act out of "dis­
interestedness" which, in "Speculations on Morals," he feels constitutes 
"the majesty of our nature" (VII, p. 76). "On the Punishment of Death" 
expresses a similar conception of liberty. If man lives intensely in the 
present, he will not distinguish between the future and the past. His 
imagination can then respond freely to events. This is What distinguishes
philosophic necessity from, fatalism; and that determination of 
the will, by which it is the active source of future events, 
from that liberty or indifference, to which the abstract lia­
bility of irremediable actions is attached, according to the 
notions of the vulgar. ("On the Punishment of Death, VI, p. 189)
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If man’s imagination can respond freely, then poetry can come back into 
his habits. The resultant intermixture of imagination and reason kills 
error. "Ode to Liberty" urges Italy to "Gather thy blood into thy heart" 
(1. 209) in order to free herself from tyranny. Yeats, in "Easter, 1916," 
likewise observes that evil results when man loses his imaginative res­
ponse to events. The hearts of the Irish patriots have become stone 
because of "Too long a sacrifice." Moral progress results when liberty 
is present for then the imaginative response is unbound. The absence of 
liberty causes evil, because of the unmitigated exercise of the calcula­
ting faculty.
In Shelley's review of history, it would seem difficult to distin­
guish events which exemplify creations of the poetic faculty from those 
of reason. But actions of men which are not fixed in space and time are 
expressions of the imagination. The order reflected in these creations, 
according to the Defence, is eternal, a "creation of actions according to 
the unchangeable forms of human nature" (VII, p. 115). It is in this 
sense that the doctrines of Christ, discussed earlier, and all great crea­
tions of poetry, are eternal. They reflect a rhythm and order which will 
fqrever be true of relations between men. For this reason, the Defence 
states that the epics of Homer are eternal:
Homer embodied the ideal perfection of his age in human char­
acter . . . .  The truth and beauty of friendship, patriotism, 
and persevering devotion to an object, were unveiled to their 
depths in these immortal creations . . . .  (VII, p. 116)
Reason, we learn from the Defence, is operative only in space and 
time and is relevant to a "certain combination of events which can never 
again recur" (VII, p. 115). Moral progress results only when man rises 
above the temptations of the temporal order; he must not submit to ex­
ternal necessity. As the imagination acts unconsciously, man is unable
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to predict its operation. Its influence can come at any time to lift 
the veil of familiarity from his actions. The Defence thus notes sever­
al acts of the Romans as being direct expressions of the imagination:
The life of Camillus, the death of Regulus; the expectations 
of the Senators, in their godlike state, of the victorious 
Gauls; the refusal of the Cannae, were not the consequences 
of a refined calculation of the probable personal advantage 
to result from such a rhythm and order in the shews of life, 
to those who were at once the poets and the actors of these 
immortal dramas. The imagination beholding the beauty of this 
order, created it out of itself according to its own idea; 
the consequence was empire, and the reward ever-living fame.
(VII, p. 125)
Thus, in the "Ode to Liberty," habits of action due to the imagination
are distinguished from those of the reason by their universal or partial 
nature.
When "Ode to Liberty" begins, the earth is a "chaos and a curse" 
(1. 22), for liberty is not in existence. Instead, there is "power from 
worst producing worst" (1. 23). In the origins of civilization, the 
instincts which are part of man's solitary, and thus selfish, nature 
determine his actions. Beasts warred on beasts, worms on worms, and 
men on men, because "each heart was as a hell of storms" (1. 30). The 
effects of nature are harmful in some instances, because man is a social 
animal. The influence of the imagination and reason tempers his heart, 
but a harmony in social relations must develop first to free him. Li­
berty is a state of mind and does not come until the imagination has 
been cultivated to the point where it can lift man out of his savagery. 
Later, when man's reason becomes the dominant power, he is bound to a 
necessity of a different kind. The god in man or the animal can equally 
devour the other.
As long as the components of man's nature (his reason, imagination
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and senses) are dissociated, he is subject to error. The reason, unable 
to recall all the ideas associated with an event, fits Promethean ideas 
into Procrustean beds. The independent activity of the imagination, 
fancy, produces fictions. An object presented to the memory or senses 
properly activates the imagination. Attempting to satisfy his senses, 
man is no better off than in his original solitary state. Unable to 
properly fit means to ends, he may cause pain to others and his own gra­
tification may only be a partial one. Moral progress takes place only 
when his instincts are integrated with his reason and when he develops 
his knowledge of human nature and of social relations. These developments 
are possible with the cultivation of the imagination. A harmony among 
these three powers and a resultant progression in morals is achieved 
through love, the force which cultivates the imagination.
"A Discourse on the Manners of the Ancients," states that there must 
be a balance among the powers of man; an imbalance in any one direction 
produces evil:
. . . Love . . '. is the universal thirst for a communion not 
merely of the senses, but of our whole nature, intellectual, 
imaginative and sensitive; and which, when individualized, 
becomes an imperious necessity, only to be satisfied by the 
complete or partial, actual or supposed, fulfilment of its 
claims. (VII, p. 228)
When man is no longer determined by necessity, whether sensual or ra­
tional, he is free and his imaginative response is unhampered.
«
The imagination keeps the proper balance between the reason and 
the instincts. In this sense, the imagination may be defined as a bio- 
rational power. It does not unify the human psyche, but the entire man. 
The archetypes in man’s mind need the instincts to realize them. If the 
imagination is destroyed in man, man is destroyed.
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The cultivation of the "social sympathies" takes time. During the
formation of early civilizations, such as the Egyptian, man was "savage,
cunning, blind, and rude" (1. 37); liberty still did not exist. "For
thou wert not," which Shelley repeats in line eight of both stanzas two
and three, becomes a kind of refrain emphasizing the fact that man is
still a victim of change and his own passions.
Lines 46-50 suggest the harmonizing effect of nature, a power which
Shelley also describes in "On Love":
Hence in solitude, or in that deserted state when we are sur­
rounded by human beings, and yet they sympathise not with us, 
we love the flowers, the grass, and the waters, and the sky.
In the motion of the very leaves of spring, in the blue air, 
there is then found a secret correspondence with our heart.
There is eloquence in the tongueless wind, and a melody in 
the flowing brooks and the rustling of the reeds beside them, 
which by their inconceivable relation to something within 
the soul, awaken the spirits to a dance of breathless rapture, 
and bring tears of mysterious tenderness to the eyes, like the 
enthusiasm of patriotic success, or the voice of one beloved 
singing to you alone. (VI, p. 202)
Nature implants an instinct in man and, soon, his thoughts go along in
the same train as nature. This harmony between man and nature accounts
for the sympathy that man feels for its objects. Wordsworth notes a
similar effect of nature in Book One of The Prelude. He claims that the
sound of the Derwent River, mixing with his nurse's songs, composed his
thoughts and gave him
Amid the fretful dwellings of mankind
A foretaste, a dim earnest, of the calm
That nature breathes among the hills and groves.
(11. 279-281)
Once man's thoughts are in tune with nature, his imagination begins 
to play an active role; he develops foresight. Shelley describes the 
ocean waves, resounding in caves along the shores of Greece, as "prophe­
tic echoes" (1. 50). Once man learns the harmonies in nature he is no
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longer its subject.
The Greeks, when first pictured by Shelley,, are unable to practice 
husbandry: "The vine, the corn, the olive mild,/ Grew savage yet, to
human use unreconciled . . . "  (11. 52-53). But soon they are able to 
create Athens. Athens, the first home of liberty, has been created by 
"the will/ Of man" (11. 70-71). The organization of man's unconscious 
storehouse has reached the point where his imaginative response can par­
tially free him from error.
The Greeks immortalized their poetic creations in marble. These 
forms, along with the works of "bards and sages" (1. 80), serve as oracles 
(1. 75) for liberty. The ideal qualities of beauty, honour and courage 
portrayed in Greek sculpture and verse can reawaken man's imagination in 
times when these values decay. The "earth awakening blast" of Grecian 
art, like the original purity of Christian doctrines mentioned earlier, 
exposes the corrupted character of religion and oppression, and rends 
"the veil of space and time asunder" (1. 86).
Shelley recognizes Rome as the next home of liberty. Rome is said 
to feed on the milk of the "Elysian food" of Greece (11. 93-94). The 
Defence explains this, saying that the poetry of Rome is but a shadow of 
the Grecian expression (VII, p. 125). But the Defence recognizes cer­
tain creations of the Romans as direct expressions of the imagination:
The true poetry of Rome lived in its institutions; for what­
ever of beautiful, true, and majestic, they contained, could 
have sprung only from the faculty which creates the order in 
which they consist. (VII, p. 125)
Acts of. heroism by Roman Senators, and such men as Camillus, Atilius and
Regulus, are also recognized as direct expressions of the imagination
because they were performed out of disinterestedness; they were not a
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"refined calculation of the probable personal advantage to result from 
such a rhythm and order in the shews of life" ('Defence,. VII, p. 125).
When man consciously tries to fit means to ends, he falls short of the 
mark; "Expectation," a determination of the will by which it is the 
active source of future events, cannot, as the "Ode to Liberty" points 
out, fly where Liberty soars (11. 84-86).
Liberty leaves man when he forgets the metaphorical value of things:
" . . . When/ gold profaned thy Capitolian throne,/ Thou didst desert . . ." 
(11. 99-101). When man forgets the legitimate ends of gold, it becomes 
an object pursued for its own sake. The quantitative value of gold en­
slaves man. Lacking any feeling for its qualitative value, he falls into 
error.
Another sign that liberty has departed is the development of a dic­
tatorship in Rome: "The senate of the tyrants . . . sunk prone/ Slaves
of one tyrant . . . "  (11. 102-103). When the original unity of thought 
which makes up the customs and habits of the Roman institutions is for­
gotten, certain offices come to stand for the whole. Decay of the ori­
ginal value of the institutions grows until axes and rods become signs and 
symbols of power. Stanza XV describes "KING" which Shelley here calls 
a "foul gordian word" as
. . . weak itself as stubble, yet can bind
Into a mass, irrefragably firm,
The axes and the rods which awe mankind . . . .
(11. 219-221)
Evil comes upon men because their creations no longer contain the 
poetical element, Chaos and curse return to the earth and it becomes an 
"undistinguishable heap" (1, 120). Liberty deserts for a thousand years, 
from the time of Caesar through the dark ages. Shelley refers to the
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Medieval Church as the ’’Galilean Serpent” which creeps forth "from its 
sea of death, to kill and burn , , , ” (1. 118). Meanwhile, Liberty, in 
exile, teaches the woods, waves and streams that "sublimest lore which
man had dared unlearn . , . " (1. 113).
)
Liberty returns with Alfred who brought peace to England and revived 
learning. His reign, the central period of Anglo-Saxon history, provided 
sound policies and security for his successors. Freedom from war and 
strife gives man an opportunity to cultivate art and to enlarge and re­
fine his sympathies.
The creation of city states restores peace in Italy. The freedom 
that man’s spirit then gains makes possible the Renaissance and the 
flourishing of the arts. When man has freedom he can think, investigate 
his own nature, and create new forms of expression. He can also see the 
incompatibility which exists between the old institutions and his inner 
nature. In times of oppression by government, war, and religion, man is 
blinded and his moral progress is not only stunted, but regresses. He is 
not free to rearrange the forms under which he lives. But the "sunlight 
shafts [of Liberty] pierce tempest-wing'bd Error . . . "  (1. 138).
Luther's pen reflects this light of liberty (1. 142); applying the 
test of the New Testament to the hierarchy of time by going back to the 
original unity of Christian thought, he pointed out the discrepancies 
between Christ's teaching and the superstructure of the Church. Milton 
also sees beyond the night in which man lives and his work serves to 
awaken man from his trance. The American and French revolutions are 
also seen as the return of Liberty.
"Ode to Liberty" ends with an appeal to man to throw down the "im­
pious name/ Of KING" (11. 211-212) and the "pale name of PRIEST" (1. 228).
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Words, signs, and habits of action are merely arbitrary creations formed 
at one time by the imagination. They are suitable at a certain stage of 
man's moral progress, but, now that their original purpose has been for­
gotten, they should be discarded. They no longer contain any poetry, 
no intermixture of reason and imagination. The consciousness, exercising 
a tyranny over the unconscious, enslaves man.
The word, "PRIEST," should "shrink and dwindle/ Into the hell from 
which it first was hurled" (11. 228-229), that "hell" being the human 
heart. Man must return to the original purity of his poetic expressions; 
he must cut down the "overgrowth of ages." Shelley calls for a revival 
of the intermixture of imagination and reason:
Oh, that the wise from their bright minds would kindle
Such lamps within the dome of this dim world,
That the pale name of PRIEST might shrink and dwindle . . . .
(11. 226-228)
Poets who expose this "over-growth" free man from the gordian knots 
which entangle his mind. Man then becomes the master of his own destiny:
He who taught man to vanquish whatsoever
Can be between the cradle and the grave
Crowned him the King of Life. (11. 241-243)
Shelley warns, in closing, that the efforts of the wise may be only 
a "vain endeavour!/ If on his own high will, a willing slave,/ [Man] has 
enthroned the oppression and the oppressor" (11. 243-245). Man creates 
his own evil. Liberty only exists when his mind has been conditioned 
to the point where his imaginative response can free him from space and 
time when he acts out of disinterested benevolence:
Blind Love, and equal Justice, and the Fame
Of what has been, the Hope of what will be?
0 Liberty! if such could be thy name
Wert thou disjoined from them, or they from thee . . . .
(11, 264-267)
The sonnet, "Political Greatness," points out that if man is to be master
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of his own destiny, he must first rule himself;
Man who man would be, 
Must rule the empire of himself; in it 
Must be supreme, establishing his throne 
On vanquished will, quelling the anarchy 
Of hopes and fears, being himself alone.
(11, 10-14)
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CHAPTER VI
LOVE AND THE FALL FROM EVIL 
Shelley, in the tradition initiated by Shaftesbury, emphasizes 
feeling rather than reason. Feelings indicate man's state of well-being 
in relation to the universe. Man becomes aware of moral progress when 
his pleasurable feelings become greater and more prolonged. He prepares 
the way for enlarging his sympathies when he investigates the forms under 
which he lives and exposes any incompatibility between them and his na­
ture. There is a certain order or rhythm in life which Shelley calls the 
beautiful and the true (Defence, VII, p. 111). Man must consider his 
own nature in any system devised to regulate society, for there is a 
certain order or rhythm in his habits which affords him the greatest
pleasure. The closer that he gets to this order, the freer he will be
from evil. The Defence states that the "instrument" of moral progress 
is the imagination and in the same passage we also learn that the great 
secret of morals is love (VII, p. 118).
The Defence explains that love is a "going out of our own nature,
and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in 
thought, action, or person, not our own" (VII, p. 118). This empathic 
state of mind cultivates the imagination. By going out of his own nature 
and referring "accents and gestures significant" of different feelings 
to his own feelings, man becomes aware of the feelings of others. He 
learns to recognize natures similar to his own and to avoid pain and 
promote pleasure,
53
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Love opposes selfishness. In his original solitary state, man is 
unaware of the existence of other natures similar to his own. His feelings 
are circumscribed within a very small area and he is selfish. The rea- 
soner, who is the product of a civilization which has overgrown itself, 
is also selfish, because his calculations, dissociated from imagination, 
are narrow. His world becomes more and more circumscribed as his values 
continue to decay. He acts to protect his own interests, benefiting an 
inner circle, but forgets society as a whole. Man must regain his aware­
ness of the feelings of others. Love, acting to cultivate the imagination, 
brings the poetry back into human relations and lifts men "out of the 
dull vapours of the little world of self" (Defence, VII, p. 128).
Moral progress results when man intensely apprehends life. He can 
then see beyond the apparent uniformity and, thus, lift the veil of fa­
miliarity. Shelley warns in "Speculations on Morals" that no one action, 
when considered in its entirety, is essentially similar to any other.
Mari must note the particular characteristics of each human action in 
order for moral progress to take place;
It is in the due appreciating the general effects of their 
peculiarities, and in cultivating the habit of acquiring 
decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising out of 
! [them] in particular cases, that the most important part of 
moral science consists. ("Speculations On Morals," VII, p. 82)
As man's imagination is more fully cultivated, he becomes more free
from error. His nature becomes more fully integrated. If his nature is
divided, love becomes an "imperious necessity." Driven by his senses, 
man may only achieve a partial satisfaction of his needs.("On Love," VII, 
p. 228), He develops his imagination fully by identifying with as many 
other thoughts, actions, and persons as possible. Epipsychidion warns 
that the man who has a limited imagination becomes trapped in time and




The heart, that loves, the brain that contemplates,
The life that wears, the spirit that creates 
One object, and one form, and builds thereby 
A sepulchre for its eternity.
(11. 169-173)
A few lines before this! passage, Shelley, referring to the imagination's
power to dispel error, identifies love with the imagination:
Love is like understanding, that grows bright,
Gazing on many truths; 'tis like thy light,
Imagination! which from earth and sky,
And from the depths of human fantasy,
As from a thousand prisms and mirrors, fills 
The Universe with glorious beams, and kills
Error, the worm, with many a sun-like arrow
Of its reverberated lightning. (11. 162-169)
The madman in Julian and Maddalo exemplifies man's failure to cul­
tivate his imagination fully. Julian suspects that a " ’want of that true
theory, still/ "Which seeks a "soul of goodness" in things ill/ Or in 
himself or others . . . (11. 203-205) caused the madman's insanity.
The madman states that "'loathed scorn and outrage unrelenting/ Met love
excited by far other' seeming . . . '" (11. 333-334). The madman had
fallen in love, but was scorned. The woman was not his sympathetic 
equal. If the madman had acquired more completely "decisive knowledge" 
regarding the effects of particular actions, he could have avoided error. 
He would have perceived that the woman would not harmonize with his na-
t
ture.
Both the Defence (VII, p. 118) and "On the Manners of the Ancients" 
(VII, p. 227) note that man's attitude toward love has changed through 
the ages. As love is more perfectly realized, the imagination becomes 
enlarged and refined, bringing about a resultant change in man's insti­
tutions. Both of the works cited above state that Greek civilization
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was founded upon an imperfection. As the "On the Manners of the Ancients"
goes on to explain, the Greeks lacked the "legitimate object" of senti­
mental love. Their institutions reflect this incomplete realization of 
man's nature:
. . . All the virture and the wisdom of the Periclean age 
arose under other institutions, in spite of the diminution 
which personal slavery and the inferiority of women, recog­
nised by law and opinion, must have produced in the delicacy, 
the strength, the comprehensiveness, and the accuracy of their 
conceptions, in moral, political, and metaphysical science, 
and perhaps in every other art and science. (VII, p. 227)
Man's nature is quite complex, for his instincts are highly refined.
"On the Manners of the Ancients" explains that man, even in his "wildest 
state . . . [is] . . .  a social being" (VII, p. 228). There is a certain 
"rhythm or order" in his habits peculiar to his nature. "On the Manners 
of the Ancients" states that man's instincts become "more intimate and 
complete . . .  in proportion to the development which [his] nature re­
ceives from civilisation . . . "  (VII, p. 228). For example, the "An­
cients" defines the sentiment of love as a "universal thirst" for a 
"communion not merely of the senses, but of our whole nature, intellectual,
imaginative and sensitive . . . "  (VII, p. 228).
j The essay, "On Love," defining love, indicates that man's instincts
are similar to an animal's and are not rationalistic archetypes. They
also are present at birth:
We are born into the world, and there is something within us 
which, from the instant that we live, more and more thirsts 
after its likeness. It is probably in correspondence with 
this law that the infant drains milk from the bosom of its 
mother; this propensity develops itself with the development 
of our nature. ("On Love," VI, p. 201)
22 Shelley states in several places that an "instinct" in man de­
termines his actions. In an earlier draft of the Defence, Shelley defines 
the operation of the imagination as making an "instinctive adjustment" of
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This interpretation is similar to Humels. In An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding he states that instincts are innate;
It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to 
secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or 
mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, 
may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, 
and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the 
understanding. (Enquiries, p. 55)
A few pages later in the Enquiry, we learn that the instinct in man is
similar to that in animals:
Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, 
which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which 
teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, 
and the whole economy and order of its nursery.
(Enquiries, p. 108)
Therefore, although the Greeks lacked the "legitimate object" of senti­
mental love, they still were fully capable of realizing it, for this 
sympathy is an instinct which is part of man's nature.
"On the Manners of the Ancients" states that the natural attraction 
for a man is a woman, but because of the way Greek society was established, 
women were slaves and not on the same level as men. The men could not
"sounds or motions . . . to . . . impressions" (VII, p. 352). In the 
same sentence he says that this "principle" is found "perhaps within all 
sentient beings" (VII, p. 109). In "On the Manners of the Ancients," a 
passage pertinent to this problem adds some complication, for there are 
two versions of it. One, in an excerpt of the "Ancients" published by 
Thomas Medwin in the Athenaeum for September 29, 1832, reads, "The mind 
selects among those who most resemble it, that which is most its arche­
type and instinctively fills up the interstices of the imperfect image .
. . " (VII, p. 362). The other, published by Mary Shelley in 1840, reads, 
"This object of sentimental love, or its archetype, forever exists in the 
mind, which selects among those who resemble it, that which most resem­
bles it; and instinctively etcJ' (VII, p. 228). Notwithstanding Shelley's, 
or Mary Shelley's, calling the instinct an "archetype," the important 
distinction made is that the mind "instinctively" fills up the inter­
stices of the imperfect image. In Prometheus Unbound, after man's fall 
into grace at the end of Act III, Shelley reaffirms man's animal nature:
" . . . man/ Passionless?— no, yet free from guilt or pain,/ Which were, 
for his will made or suffered them . . . "  (Ill, iv, 11. 197-199).
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find their equal, except in their own sex, but this does not represent
a full realization of man's nature. Institutions are created by the
imagination, but since the imagination was not fully developed, neither
\
were the institutions.
Women have since become equal to men, and their freedom, according
to the Defence, "produced the poetry of sexual love" (VII, p. 127).
Shelley does not know for sure what caused the emancipation of women, but
he suggests in the "Ancients," and the Defence, that it may
arise from some imperfect influence of the doctrines of Jesus 
Christ, . . .  or from the institutions of chivalry, or from 
a certain fundamental difference of physical nature existing 
in the Celts, or from a combination of all or any of these 
causes, acting on each other . . . .  (VII, p. 227)
Since modern Europeans have more fully realized their nature, their ima­
gination is more enlarged and refined and their institutions represent an 
improvement over the Greek. For Shelley, social progress is connected 
with moral progress.
Man will free himself from evil altogether when his imagination is 
fully cultivated. Love, by cultivating the imagination, integrates rea­
son and imagination; and man, contrarily to the Gnostic tradition of the 
emanation and fall of creation, falls into grace. There is a certain or­
der in the "shews of life," according to the Defence, called the "true 
and the beautiful" (VII, p. 111). When man's imagination is enlarged 
and refined, he comes closer to experiencing the harmony which underlies 
existence, including social relations.
By the cultivation of the imagination lifting the veil of familiarity 
from life, man reaches a truer integration of his personality. He reali­
zes a certain rhythm and order in his habits from which he derives an 
intenser and purer pleasure. As was pointed out, the Greek practice of
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love is irreconcilable to what Shelley feels mankind can attain:
This much is to be admitted that, represent this passion as 
you will, there is something totally irreconcilable in its 
cultivation to the beautiful order of social life, to an equal 
participation in which all human beings have an indefeasible 
claim and from which hal^of the human race by the Greek ar­
rangement were excluded.
Poetry, like love, also cultivates man's imagination. It enlarges 
and refines his sympathies with the ideal conceptions embodied in its 
form. These are ideas from which man,derives an intenser and purer plea­
sure. As man cultivates his imagination, he assimilates the "beautiful" 
which he perceives and rejects imperfections, thus forming a miniature 
within himself of ideal forms of conduct which forms a basis for judg­
ment :
We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it 
were of our entire self, yet deprived of all that we condemn 
or despise, the ideal prototype of every thing excellent or 
lovely that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the 
nature of man. Not only the portrait of our external being, 
but an assemblage of the minutest particles of which our na­
ture is composed; a mirror whose surface reflects only the 
forms of purity and brightness; a soul within our soul that 
describes a circle around its proper paradise, which pain, and ^  
sorrow, and evil dare not overleap. ("On Love," VI, pp. 201-202)
With this more refined set of instincts which determines his will into
23 Percy Bysshe Shelley, "On the Manners of the Ancient Greeks," in 
Shelley’s Prose: Or the Trumpet of a Prophecy, ed. David L. Clark (New
Mexico, 1954), p. 223.
24 See Shelley's preface to "Alastor": "[The poet] images to himself 
the Being whom he loves. Conversant with speculations of the sublimest 
and most perfect natures, the vision in which he embodies his own ima­
ginations unites all of wonderful, or wise, or beautiful, which the 
poet, the philosopher, or the lover could depicture. The intellectual 
faculties, the imagination, the functions of sense, have their respec­
tive requisitions on the sympathy of corresponding powers in other human
, beings. The Poet is represented as uniting these requisitions, and at­
taching them to a single image. He seeks in vain for a prototype of his 
conception."(I, p. 173)
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action, man feels a want in imperfect objects around him. Thus, unlike
the solitary man, he is no longer subject to change:
. . . Poetry defeats the curse which binds us to be subjected 
to the accident of surrounding impressions. And whether it 
spreads its own figured curtain, or withdraws life's dark 
veil from before the scene of things, it equally creates for 
us a being within our being. It makes us the inhabitants of a 
world to which the familiar world is a chaos.
(Defence, VII, p. 137)
The ideal prototype, the refined sympathies, within man impels him,
instinctively, to search for his antitype. A person whose sympathies
are highly refined may find a society which is incapable of response:
Hence in solitude, or in that deserted state when we are sur­
rounded by human beings, and yet they sympathise not with-us, 
we love the flowers, the grass, and the waters, and the sky.
. . . Sterne says that, if he were in a desert, he would love . 
some cypress. So soon as this want or power is dead, man be­
comes the living sepulchre of himself, and what yet survives 
is the mere husk of what once he was. ("On Love," VI, p. 202)
We learn in Prometheus Unbound that love must be "given and returned" if 
"evil and error" are to fall (II, v, 11. 39-40 and III, iii, 11. 59-62).^ 
If man does not find his antitype, other natures which have refined sym­
pathies similar to his, his imaginative response becomes dulled and then 
is extinguished. "Alastor" records such a failure, but in Epipsychidion,
Shelley finds his antitype in Emily Viviani.
Although the order and rhythm of modern European life represent an .
improvement over the Greek, Shelley does not know what the ultimate
25 Milton, in Paradise Lost, also says that love must be given and 
returned. Adam senses a want in the forms of creation surrounding him. 
Man can only obtain a sense of satisfaction with his antitype, a creature 
with sympathies refined to a pitch similar to his own:
Among unequals what society
Can sort, what harmony, or true delight?
Which must be mutual, in proportion due 
Given and received; but in disparity,
The one intense, the other still remiss,
Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove 
Tedious alike. (Book VIII, 11. 383-389)
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perfection of man eventually will be, "On the Manners of the Ancients"
states that there is room for further refinement;
The practices and customs of modern Europe are essentially 
different from and incomparably less pernicious than either, 
however remote from what an enlightened mind cannot fail to 
desire as the future destiny of human beings. (VII, p. 229)
The ultimate point, of man's moral progress will be reached when his 
feelings become awakened to those of all mankind, both in the present and 
the past. When man can conceive of an infinite number of thoughts in a 
minute, time stops; he is at the still point of the turning world. Shel­
ley, at least at the time of the composition of Queen Mab, believes that 
man's sensibility is perfectible:
If, therefore, the human mind, by any future improvement of its 
sensibility, should become conscious of an infinite number of 
ideas in a minute, that minute would be eternity. I do not 
hence infer that the actual space between the birth and death 
of a man will ever be prolonged; but that his sensibility is 
perfectible, and that the number of ideas which his tgjnd is 
capable of receiving is indefinite. (I, pp. 156-157)
Shelley, in that work, also believed that love freed man from evil:
Dark flood of time!
Roll as it listeth thee— I measure not 
By months or moments thy ambiguous course,
Another may stand by me on the brink 
1 And watch the bubble whirled beyond his ken 
That pauses at my feet. The sense of love 
' The thirst for action, and the impassioned thought 
Prolong my being . . . .  (I, p. 157)
Prometheus in Prometheus Unbound represents man who has this highly 
cultivated imagination. He is
the type of the highest perfection of moral and intellectual
26 Compare: As the poet in "Alastor" has cultivated his imagination
to this point, he is isolated; he cannot find his prototype in a world 
defined by space and time:
The fountains of divine philosophy
Pled not his thirsting lips, and all of great,
Or good, or lovely, which the sacred past 
In truth or fable consecrates, he felt 
And knew. ("Alastor," 11. 71-75)
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nature, impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the 
best and noblest end. (Prometheus Unbound, Shelley's Preface,
II, p. 172)
His name signifies forethought, as that of his brother, Epimetheus, sig­
nifies afterthought. As afterthought, or reason, is a conscious power, 
its predictions are limited. Forethought, the imagination, has command 
over all its ideas and is thus more efficient than reason. Prometheus 
Unbound, an allegory, describes the conflict within man between his rea­
son and his imagination. I would like to discuss the play briefly to 
summarize some of the ideas contained in my thesis.
The fact that Prometheus has been chained to a rock by Jupiter and 
tortured for the past 3,000 years is a paradoxical situation because it 
was Prometheus who gave Jupiter his power: "Then Prometheus/ Gave wis­
dom, which is strength, to Jupiter,/ . . . And Jove now reigned . . .  11 
(II, iv, 11. 43-49). Prometheus, because of his imaginative capacity, 
is a poet, the man best suited to see what form of civil habits would 
best benefit man. Man adopts the forms which the poet creates to govern 
his life. "[Reasoners] follow the footsteps of poets, and copy the 
sketches of their creations into the book of common life" (Defence, VII, 
p. 132). Jupiter is a creation of Prometheus designed to govern the 
affairs of men.
The only restriction which Prometheus places on Jupiter is, "Let 
man be free" (II, iv, 1. 45). If Jupiter maintains the metaphorical 
nature of his office, man will continue to realize that he is only an 
invention, a conception which is representative of an idea. This leaves 
man's imaginative capacity free to develop. By the same token, man is 
also free to rearrange and readjust Jupiter's relationship to fit his 
changing powers. In the ideal sense, democracy is a form of government
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which can be changed to fit the needs of the people. When Jupiter
becomes an absolute, man’s imagination becomes blunted and his foresight
deficient. In the telescoped action of the play, misery befalls man as
soon as reason reigns:
. . . And Jove now reigned; for on the race of man 
First famine, and then toil, and then disease,
Strife, wounds, and ghastly death unseen before,
Fell . . . .  (II, iv, 11. 49-52)
Prometheus hates and curses Jupiter for chaining him to the rock.
He forgets that Jupiter is his own invention and commits the greatest 
folly of man, to curse that which he has invented. A change in’the moral 
action of the poem occurs when suffering brings wisdom to Prometheus:
I speak in grief,
Not exultation, for I hate no more,
As then ere misery made me wise. (I, 11. 56-58)
Prometheus no longer hates Jupiter, but now pities him. As soon as he 
pities Jupiter, he is identifying with him, an act which is akin to love. 
Since hatred is an active determination of the will, Prometheus' conscious­
ness would exercise a tyranny over his unconscious. Through pity, he 
again becomes capable of an imaginative response. Since Prometheus re­
presents the highest perfection of the imaginative powers, he is now 
able to perceive Jupiter's imperfect nature. He can see Jupiter as a 
creation which falls short of the ideal perfection within himself.
When Prometheus regains his imaginative powers he becomes free from 
space and time. By his intense apprehension of the present and a resul­
tant imaginative response, he is able to determine by feeling that Jupi­
ter is not eternal, Jupiter has become absolute and, thus, is trapped 
in space and time. This seems to be the secret which Prometheus with­
holds from Jupiter. Prometheus also realizes that there is no reason to
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be in awe of this fabrication.
Throughout his imprisonment, Jupiter sends Furies to torture Pro­
metheus. They show him visions of the confusion among men:
The good want power, but to weep barren tears.'
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom;
And all best things are thus confused to ill.
(I, 11. 625-628)
Prometheus, who has regained his imaginative powers, is able to see the 
true nature of these actions: '"I close my tearless eyes, but see more
clear/ Thy works within my woe-illumed mind,/ Thou subtle tyrant'" (I, li. 
636-638). Because Prometheus has felt the imperfect nature of Jupiter, 
the visions no longer torture him. He realizes that the evil actions 
are the fruits of a tree which is not rooted in eternity and they streng­
then his conviction that Jupiter's reign is to be short-lived.
The sights with which thou torturest gird my soul
With new endurance, till the hour arrives
When they shall be no types of things which are.
(I, 11. 643-645)
Jupiter's throne is built on fear and tradition (III, i, 1. 10). In 
order to secure his power he has begotten a "fatal child" intended to 
stamp out the last spark in man, a final misery to extinguish man's 
hope (III, i, 11. 18-24). If man continues to acquiesce in the forms 
which weaken his spirit, he may eventually lose any chance of regenera­
tion. Man who is in' time and space must preserve his spontaneity, or be 
ever subject to time.
The "fatal child," however, turns out to be Demogorgon, who calls 
himself, "Eternity" (III, i, 1. 52). Jupiter, who has become an absolute 
power and fixed in space and time, is unable to endure Eternity. Con­
tained in any absolute is the seed of its eventual destruction. "The 
future is contained within the present as the plant within the seed"
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(Defence, VII, p. 110).
Prometheus is released from the rock and reunited with Asia who re-̂  
presents- love. The significance of this union is the fact that the ima­
gination has to be united with love if there is to be moral progress.
Man has to fill up his imagination gap. Together love and wisdom can 
create a new order and the regeneration of man. Love turns the mind in 
the direction in which the imagination can be operative.
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c o n c l u s i o n
Shelley’s ambition as a philosopher needs to Be appreciated when 
reading his poetry. The Best approach Is to read his prose before, or 
along with, his poetry, Shelley’s own intention during his early career 
was to Become a philosopher, and at one point he felt impelled to choose 
between that and poetry. He wrote several works in an attempt to realize 
this ambition. Two early essays, "Speculations on Metaphysics" and "Spe­
culations on Morals," were intended as complete philosophical treatises.
A Philosophical View of Reform and A. Defence of Poetry evidence his con­
tinuing interest in this pursuit and amply demonstrate his ability. A 
Defence of Poetry was to contain three parts, the second to be "an appli­
cation of these principles [°f poetry] to the present state of the culti­
vation of Poetry, and a defence of the attempt to idealize the modern 
forms of manners and opinions, and compel them into a subordination to 
the imaginative and creative faculty" (Defence, VII, p. 140). The fully 
developed Defence was to show the relation between a system of philoso­
phy, a theory of poetry, and a theory of society.
Shelley seems to respect only a philosophy which is grounded on a 
stable basis and his works reflect his sceptical approach. Although his 
system represents a synthesis of many views, he emphasizes the British 
empiricists, and, especially, Hume, Hume gives a more satisfying ex­
planation of the nature of man and his relation to the universe, a pro­
blem which. Shelley regards as more psychological than philosophical.
Following Hume, Shelley- emphasizes the importance of the imagination, 
As a kind of associative response, representing an accumulation of all of
66
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
67
man*s former experiences, Shelley recognizes its authority oyer the r^a^ 
son, He considers the imagination as- closer to reality, for, when it is 
activated by some event in nature or society, its creations are in har^ 
mony with the course of nature or society. Because of this, Shelley 
argues that poetry, the ^expression of the imagination" (Defence, VII, 
p, 109), should form the basis for regulating the affairs of men, Man 
determines the moral character of his ideas by the feeling, whether 
painful or pleasurable, which accompanies the activity of his imagina­
tion, But the reason, lacking this qualifying basis, leads man further 
and further away from a harmonious existence.
Readers of Shelley's poetry usually criticize his emphasis on ab­
stractions and his didacticism, Shelley, I think, would deny the pre­
sence of either. Rather than being abstract, Shelley is defining reality 
as he feels it. It is we who live in a world of abstractions. Shelley 
would refute the charge of didacticism which Eliot, for example, finds 
obtrusive in the poetry by answering that he is only fulfilling his role 
as a poet. Poets bring down "light and fire from , . . eternal regions" 
(Defence, VII, p. 135). This truth can only be contained in poetry, the 
reflection of reality. If we fail to realize that Shelley is not spea­
king in mere abstractions and not being didactic, we miss the truth that 
lies in the poetry. What Eliot terms philosophic theory is the truth 
that Shelley is communicating. By labelling Shelley as abstract or 
didactic, we are assuming that our view of life defines reality. Shelley 
realizes that society can be freed from error and evil only by poetry 
which is not an abstraction.
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